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Professor, American Bar Foundation. My thanks to Meredith McBride for
inviting me to contribute a short concluding essay situating this inaugural
annual empirical issue within the field of empirical legal scholarship.
Empirical legal scholarship was once a novel and contested participant
in the legal academy. In the twenty-first century, it has emerged as an active
and valued player. That is not to say that empirical research has replaced
doctrinal scholarship, or even that an empirical perspective is
uncontroversial as a foundation for conclusions about how the legal system
ought to operate. 1 The current legal landscape, however, does reflect that
empirical legal scholarship is now recognized as a legitimate contributor to
our understanding of law and the operation and effects of legal institutions.
What are the signs of an environment friendly to empirical scholarship?
One indicator appears in Professor Sarah Lawsky’s report on entry-level
tenure-track hiring between 2011 and 2018. 2 One in five candidates hired
between 2011 and 2016 reported they had PhD degrees in non-law
disciplines, primarily in fields that provide training in empirical research.3
That percentage increased to 34% in 2017 and 36% in 2018. 4 Although these
percentages are based on modest annual hiring numbers (hiring levels fell
over this period from 155 in 2011 to 75 in 2018), 5 they suggest the value of
1 Clare Huntington, The Empirical Turn in Family Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 227, 232 (2018)
(“[E]mpirical evidence does not help decisionmakers prioritize competing values and thus should not
play an outsized role.”).
2 Sarah Lawsky, Entry Level Hiring 2018 - PhDs and Clinical Hires, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 21,
2018), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/05/entry-level-hiring-2018-phds-and-clinicalhires.html [https://perma.cc/W39M-5BEH]. The figures are based on self-reported data.
3 Id.
4 If those with PhD degrees in law are included, the corresponding levels are one in four between
2011 and 2016, 42% for 2017, and 48% for 2018. Id.
5 Id.
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a PhD on the academic legal market. A majority of those hired in 2018 also
had clerkships or fellowships, 6 which are traditional indicators of preparation
for the legal academy, so this group of new hires has a well-rounded profile.
Whether or not these scholars focus on conducting empirical research, this
cohort should be well-positioned to consider and critically evaluate the
empirical work being produced in the legal academy.
Another marker of the appetite for empirical scholarship is reflected in
its presence in law reviews and symposia. Studies conducted using a variety
of methods and definitions of “empirical research” all find that empirical
scholarship reported in law reviews has grown and appears to be continuing
to grow. 7 Frequent symposia, including annual conferences, focusing on
empirical scholarship have been held in the past twenty years. 8 Annual
conferences include, for example, the Conference on Empirical Legal
Studies (CELS), first held at the University of Texas Law School in October
2006. CELS held its thirteenth annual conference in 2018. The enthusiasm
for empirical work has also generated specialized annual empirical legal
conferences. In 2018, for example, Duke Law School held the ninth annual
Empirical Health Law Conference, and Northwestern University Pritzker
School of Law and Cardozo School of Law cohosted the fifth annual
Roundtable on Empirical Methods in Intellectual Property. These examples
suggest that empirical legal scholarship is not merely a temporary fad, but
rather a more enduring investment by the legal academy.
The scholarship produced by this activity has not escaped criticism—
much of which is targeted at the law review as a vehicle for empirical work.
Critics often attribute weaknesses to the methods used to select which
articles will be published in law reviews. 9 They point out that, unlike the
research published in peer-reviewed scientific publications, articles
6

Sarah Lawsky, Spring Self-Reported Entry Level Hiring Report 2018, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 21,
2018),
https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/05/spring-self-reported-entry-level-hiringreport-2018.html [https://perma.cc/4C5G-4EKB].
7 See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Pam Mueller, Empirical Legal Scholarship in Law Reviews,
6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 581, 594 (2010); Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A
Statistical Study, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 517, 528 (2000); Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical
Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 144 (2006); Marci Hoffman & Katherine
Topulos, Tyranny of the Available: Under-represented Topics, Approaches, and Viewpoints,
34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 175, 178–79 (2008).
8 Diamond & Mueller, supra note 7, at 592 n.6 (listing sixteen law review symposia published
between 2000 and 2009).
9 For extreme expressions of this critique, see Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Student-Edited
Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1133–34 (1995), and Richard A. Posner, Against the Law Reviews:
Welcome to a World Where Inexperienced Editors Make Articles About the Wrong Topics Worse, LEGAL
AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 57. For another example, see James Lindgren, An Author’s Manifesto, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 527, 540 (1994), arguing that “[t]he net effects of student editing are biased article selection
and a tedious sameness in prose style, a style reduced to the level of third-year law students.”
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published in law reviews are traditionally selected and edited by law student
editors who may or may not have any background in empirical research. In
contrast, the editors of scientific journals 10 typically seek the advice of
reviewers with expertise in the topic and analytic methods of the submitted
article, filling in gaps that exist even in the most accomplished general
editor’s knowledge base. I do not know of a study that has systematically
compared the methodological adequacy of empirical scholarship published
in law reviews and non-law review journals, but it would not be surprising
to find that the lack of specialized expertise and routine peer review would
disadvantage law review editors in their relative ability to recognize
important research questions and identify serious methodological
weaknesses. 11 But isn’t it possible for a law review to achieve the benefits of
a standard peer-reviewed journal? Some efforts are being made in the legal
academy to seek professional advice in making publishing decisions, but the
contours of that process are not clearly specified. 12 In surveying the
landscape, Professor Lynn LoPucki recently concluded that despite
numerous calls for a change from student-edited law reviews to peer review,
“no change is imminent.” 13
The editors of the Northwestern University Law Review decided to take
on that implicit challenge. The aim of the Law Review’s empirical issue is to
create a forum that can both capitalize on the intelligence and energy of law
school editors and systematically reap the benefits of professional
engagement. The student editors at Northwestern have attacked the omission
of peer review directly. Using the model of a disciplinary journal, they
sought professional advice on every manuscript they viewed as a potentially
publishable article, roughly one-fourth of those submitted to this first annual
issue. Each of these authors received prompt and detailed feedback on their

10

“Scientific” disciplines refer to both the physical and social sciences, including, but not limited to,
anthropology, archaeology, communication studies, economics, history, human geography,
jurisprudence, linguistics, political science, psychology, public health, and sociology.
11 Although some would disagree (for example, Lindgren, supra note 9), I am relatively confident
that a comparison of the clarity of writing would on average give law reviews the advantage. Even when
I resist the suggestions of the attentive and careful law review editors who edit the work I publish, I
inevitably find that the review process makes me clarify what I mean to say. In contrast, the editors of
most non-law review journals do a more cursory review of the prose.
12 E.g., Article Submissions, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/
submissions/article-submissions [https://perma.cc/TW8J-96ZL] (“It is our practice to subject
submissions to peer review, albeit in a form amenable to the typical law review selection timeframes.”).
13 Lynn M. LoPucki, Disciplinary Legal Empiricism, 76 MD. L. REV. 449, 477 (2017). Professor
LoPucki’s prediction may be accurate in the sense that the student editors will retain final decisionmaking power, but peer review in other disciplinary domains vests final decision-making control in the
general non-specialist editor, who is informed by peer review from specialized professionals.
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submission. 14 As Empirical Articles Editor Meredith McBride indicates in
the introduction to this issue, the response from scholars doing empirical
work has revealed an appetite for this model. The five articles selected for
the issue demonstrate the success of the result: the publications in this issue
take a range of approaches, but all make significant contributions to legal
scholarship.
A first consideration for the editors of Northwestern’s empirical issue
was to decide what to include under the rubric of empirical legal scholarship,
a nontrivial decision because the definition of “empirical scholarship” is not
unambiguous. At one extreme, some researchers recognize as empirical
scholarship only scholarship that uses statistical techniques and analyses. 15
Others expand the boundaries to include attempts to analyze data for “more
than anecdotal purposes, whether or not the analysis is quantitative,” 16 or,
most broadly, they equate empirical scholarship with research “based on
observations of the world—in other words, data, which is just a term for
facts about the world.” 17 This first empirical issue of the Northwestern
University Law Review explicitly reflects a definition of empirical legal
scholarship that is more eclectic than the quantitative constraint some would
impose. However, the articles included in the issue also demonstrate a
concern with systematic data collection that goes far beyond the mere
collection of observations about the world that others would include. The
definition operationalized by the articles in this issue is more akin to a
characterization of empirical scholarship as involving “the systematic
organization of a series of observations with the method of data collection
and analysis made available to the audience.” 18
STRENGTHENING EMPIRICAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Even if we accept that empirical legal scholarship has been gathering
steam and attracting wider interest from legal scholars, how can the academy
foster the production and publication of high-quality scholarship as we move
forward? That is, if empirical legal scholarship is to consist of more than
collecting facts, what strategies will facilitate substantive success? Below I

14 In full disclosure, I am a member of the Law Review’s Empirical Advisory Board and acted as a
reviewer for one of the articles published in this first issue.
15 Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision
Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 821.
16 Russell Korobkin, Empirical Scholarship in Contract Law: Possibilities and Pitfalls, 2002 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1033, 1035.
17 Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2002).
18 Shari Seidman Diamond, Empirical Marine Life in Legal Waters: Clams, Dolphins, and Plankton,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 803, 805.
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describe several key markers of a healthy empirical research enterprise,
indicators that are reflected in the articles appearing in this issue.
A. Transparency
Armchair-based claims arising from intuitive or purely theory-based
assumptions, however brilliant or insightful, are the antithesis of conclusions
based on empirically grounded evidence. 19 The distinction is that we may
agree that a non-empirical claim is accurate (e.g., “The United States is
advantaged by the free speech provisions of the First Amendment”), but
without inserting and measuring specific indicators that operationalize what
is meant by “advantaged” and designing a study that tests the claim as
operationalized, there is no way to evaluate the accuracy of the claim beyond
checking for agreement with the views of other scholars. And even if we find
consistency, all of those sources may be inaccurate, but there is no way to
know. One alluring, but problematic, characteristic of nonempirical claims
is that they are challenging to resist because it is hard to produce contrary
evidence as opposed to mere disagreement. In contrast, an empirical claim is
vulnerable to contrary evidence.
We have a variety of tools and methodological criteria that enable us to
probe and challenge the trustworthiness of empirically based claims. As with
nonempirical claims, evidence that results replicate across sources is an
important cue to the robustness of a claim. Consistency across studies,
particularly those showing convergent validity by producing similar results
from studies using different methodological approaches, is one source of
support, but it is not the only one. A piece of good empirical scholarship not
only presents the results but also reveals as fully as possible the methods
used to obtain those results. 20 Disclosure can take several forms, depending
on the nature of the data collection. When an author justifies an empirical
claim based on an original dataset the author has developed, greater detail is
required because the reader has no reference point other than the article itself.
Thus, the report of a brief online experimental study can and should provide
an appendix containing the full text of the scenarios that respondents viewed.
Where space is limited, the reader can be directed to a website that contains
that information. For example, Francis Shen provided both sources in a study

19

This distinction is not new. See, e.g., Paul E. Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions: Some
Reflections of a Clinical Psychologist, 27 J. SOC. ISSUES 65, 66 (1971).
20 Promises of confidentiality required for access may on occasion limit the researcher’s ability to
disclose some features of the data collection.

1233

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

of racial bias in which he asked participants to read short vignettes about
criminal defendants and assess the mental states of defendants. 21
When the author is analyzing results from an existing dataset, the author
should provide enough information to direct the reader to that source and
describe how the data obtained from it were analyzed. This form of
transparency is reflected in the detailed descriptions of the datasets used in
this issue by Jonathan Ashtor 22 and Sarath Sanga. 23 Ashtor, studying the
relationship among the information content of a patent’s disclosure, patent
validity, and technological impact, began with a dataset of patent cases in
which a decision on liability or infringement was rendered at trial or on
summary judgment in U.S. federal district courts between 2004 and 2011.24
His article describes the source of his dataset and specifies the basis on which
cases were not included in his analysis (i.e., in which rulings did not address
validity). 25 Similarly, Sanga studied the pervasiveness of employment
arbitration by drawing contracts from the set of required filings submitted to
the Securities and Exchange Commission by all U.S. public companies
between 1996 and 2016. 26 He provides the publicly available source of the
filings and describes the selection criteria he used—the SEC’s unique code
that identifies material contracts—to identify the relevant 800,000 contracts
he analyzed. 27
The optimal version of the author’s description of the dataset supplies
the reader with sufficient information to replicate the results (if they are
replicable). Indeed, the failure of attempts at replication has recently raised
serious doubts about some of the empirical findings in psychology and other
fields. 28
This ideal level of disclosure that enables follow-up research to
precisely replicate the results of the earlier study has some limits. When a
researcher must promise confidentiality as a condition of access, as in this
issue’s ethnographic study in a prosecutor’s office by Anna Offit, 29
transparency must take a different form. Documenting fully the
21 Francis X. Shen, Minority Mens Rea: Racial Bias and Criminal Mental States, 68 HASTINGS L.J.
1007 app. B (2017), available at http://www.fxshen.com/Shen_2017_MinorityMensRea_AppendixBScenarioText.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK9X-G39U] (presenting the full text of experimental scenarios).
22 Jonathan H. Ashtor, Does Patented Information Promote the Progress of Techology?, 113 NW. U.
L. REV. 943 (2019).
23 Sarath Sanga, A New Strategy for Regulating Arbitration, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1121 (2019).
24 Ashtor, supra note 22, at 963–66.
25 Id.
26 Sanga, supra note 23, at 1150–51.
27 Id.
28 See Ed Yong, Bad Copy, 485 NATURE 298 (2012).
29 Anna Offit, Prosecuting in the Shadow of the Jury, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1071 (2019).
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characteristics of the site and the methods of data collection, and
acknowledging the features of the setting and its occupants that may be
situation- or institution-specific, can enable future researchers to test the
boundaries of the reported findings. Offit, for example, reports that the U.S.
Attorney’s Office she studied was located in a district that contained a mix
of rural and urban counties with a caseload that was “characteristic of offices
in numerous federal jurisdictions across the country,” 30 but she also signals
that the office conformed to a stricter internal policy on disclosures to grand
jurors than that mandated by the Department of Justice 31 and explicitly
invites further research in state, as opposed to federal, prosecutors’ offices
to test the more general applicability of her findings. 32
B. Acknowledging Limitations
It is very tempting to look past limitations in interpreting what the
results of any empirical study can reveal. Like confirmation bias, which leads
all of us, including scholars as well as police investigators, to look for
evidence supporting our initial hunch or hypothesis, 33 we have a natural
tendency to draw larger implications from our own empirical findings—an
incentive to view what we have produced as more important than the data on
their own warrant. This tendency can lead legal scholars (and law review
editors) to look for and promote larger implications of the work they submit
and accept for publication than the findings actually justify. Restraint and
humility are worth cultivating, as few studies can cover all bases and address
all potential weaknesses. Acknowledging potential limitations of empirical
findings and cabining what implications can be confidently drawn are
hallmarks of trustworthy reporting. For example, in reporting on her
observations of the behavior of prosecutors and her interviews with them,
Anna Offit describes how prosecutorial decision-making occurs in the
shadow of prosecutors’ expectations about what a jury would do with a
case. 34 She explicitly resists the temptation to claim that the contours of the
expectations she identifies (e.g., how a jury will react to the character of
witnesses, defendants, and victims) describe what jurors actually do.
Peer review provides an important check on the tendency to overclaim,
whether explicitly or implicitly. It can do more than screen out submitted
manuscripts that make unrealistic claims. It can also call on an author to
30

Id. at 1088.
Id. at 1091.
32 Id. at 1088.
33 Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research Results, 49 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 259, 269 (1998).
34 Offit, supra note 29.
31
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produce additional data to support a claim. For example, Mary Rose, Marc
Musick, and I submitted a manuscript to the Journal of Empirical Legal
Studies describing a survey of a random sample of Texas respondents that
included questions on their lifetime experience with the jury system. 35 We
found, after controlling for age, no underrepresentation of African
Americans or other minorities on whether the respondent reported having
ever served on a jury. Reviewers (and the authors) were somewhat surprised
at this finding, and the editor and reviewers wondered whether it would
generalize beyond the Texas sample covered in this survey. We were able to
respond with supplemental data from a Field Poll survey conducted in
California that included a question on lifetime jury service and replicated the
finding, providing the needed evidence to demonstrate that the initial finding
was not idiosyncratic. 36
The authors of a peer-reviewed empirical article typically explicitly
acknowledge, and reviewers and editors often require them to specify,
limitations on their claims. Authors, for example, may specify that the data
have weaknesses that the reader should consider in crediting the results or at
least in concluding that the results will generalize to other populations or
situations. In the Rose et al. article, we acknowledged some potential
idiosyncrasies of Texas with respect to some of the characteristics we found
were significant predictors of jury service (e.g., state nativity) 37 and pointed
out distinctions between aggregate and trial-specific results: “[A]lthough
race did not predict individuals’ lifetime jury participation, these results do
not address the objections to unrepresentative panels and biases in the
selection process that are legally and morally illegitimate even when they
cancel each other out.” 38 These specifications not only provide a more
accurate characterization of the results but also offer guidance to scholars
who may build on the results in designing future research, as well as provide
a warning to policymakers who might be inclined to take empirical findings
into account. Law review authors and editors should recognize that
acknowledged limitations do not detract from the genuine advance in
knowledge an article may contain.

35 Mary R. Rose, Shari Seidman Diamond & Marc A. Musick, Selected to Serve: An Analysis of
Lifetime Jury Participation, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 33, 38 (2012). As a coauthor, I had access to
the exchange between the authors and editor, in addition to copies of the reviews.
36 Id. at 45–47.
37 Id. at 51.
38 Id. at 50.
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C. Taking Measurement and Design Seriously
It is tempting in the day of big data simply to greet eagerly a readily
available dataset that includes a large sample and many measures, and to
neglect a careful evaluation of the data collection that produced this easily
accessible data. Similarly, a standard methodology used in prior research
may offer a comfortable path to designing a new study without having to
reinvent the wheel. Questions about the construct validity of a measure as
designed (e.g., Does speed of responding reflect the confidence level of the
respondent?) as well as evidence about the accuracy of the initial data entry
require attention from authors, reviewers, and editors. Issa KohlerHausmann in this issue revisits standard ways of conceptualizing and
measuring racial discrimination, including the widely accepted research
designs used to detect discrimination. 39 She thus raises questions about both
the definition and the measurement of discrimination. In particular, she
points out the incompleteness of what we can learn about discrimination
from audit studies that attempt to hold all factors except race constant (e.g.,
Devah Pager’s audit study matching job applicants on age, race, physical
appearance, and general style of self-presentation to study the effects of race
and felony drug convictions on willingness to hire similarly qualified job
applicants). 40 She urges a more context-based understanding of racial (and
gender) discrimination that takes into account social meanings. 41 Such
critical looks at design and measurement are crucial to building a robust
foundation for empirical legal scholarship.
Sarath Sanga’s study of arbitration contracts provides an elegant
example of what norms of transparency and attention to measurement can
add to that foundation. 42 His empirical analysis of the contracts in his study
reveals that employment contracts are common, and are disproportionately
likely to contain arbitration clauses, relative to the other fourteen types of
contracts he examined. 43 He used machine coding to identify the arbitration
contracts, but he did not stop there: he conducted a human-coded audit of a
sample of randomly selected contracts in his dataset to ensure that the
arbitration clauses were successfully identified by the machine procedure.44

39

Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Eddie Murphy and the Dangers of Counterfactual Causal Thinking About
Detecting Racial Discrimination, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1163 (2019).
40 Id. at 1208 (discussing DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA
OF MASS INCARCERATION (2007)).
41 Id. at 1205–06.
42 Sanga, supra note 23.
43 Id. at 1151 tbl.2.
44 Id. at 1151.
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They were (99.3% were successfully coded). 45 The attention to measurement
reflected here also revealed an important obstacle that a machine-coded
approach may encounter. His attempt to identify noncompete provisions in
the contracts did not succeed in reliably identifying those contracts. 46 He
suggests that the specificity of a category will determine how susceptible it
is likely to be to machine-coding: the most specific and the most general
categories are the easiest to identify, whereas the midlevel categories are
harder, but more important. By presenting this example of a failed
measurement effort and discussing its implications, Sanga sets the agenda
for scholars who want to advance methods of capturing concepts not
currently subject to easy machine-coding.
D. Multiple Methods
When results from different empirical studies using different measures
and research designs converge, our confidence in the reliability and validity
of the results appropriately increases. For example, in studying jury
composition in civil trials in Arizona, I, along with my colleagues Mary Rose
and Beth Murphy, found a substantial representation of jurors with relevant
occupational expertise (e.g., a nurse in a malpractice case, an engineer in a
vehicular tort case). 47 Was this idiosyncratic? Simply a matter of bad
lawyering? According to popular belief, attorneys for one side or another
inevitably remove such jurors. We followed up with a survey of the members
of a prestigious group of experienced trial attorneys and asked about the
composition of the jury in their last trial and the nature of the case. We
replicated our finding that “expert” jurors were not systematically removed,
and in some cases appeared to be favored.48 In retrospect, we think we have
an explanation for the result: jurors with case-relevant substantive expertise
are retained when both parties believe that the facts favor them.
Within one investigation, a researcher can also take advantage of
multiple methods to build a model of the behavior at issue and test its
consistency from different vantage points. In her study of prosecutorial
decision-making, with Institutional Review Board approval, Anna Offit
conducted semi-structured interviews with 133 Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and
also participated in jury selection proceedings and case preparation meetings,
allowing her to observe prosecutor behavior and discussions about jury

45

Id.
Id. at 1152.
47 Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose & Beth Murphy, Embedded Experts on Real Juries: A
Delicate Balance, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 885, 890 (2014).
48 Id. at 900–02.
46
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selection and related case preparation in their natural context. 49 This research
strategy enabled her to use the observations as a check on what prosecutors
were telling her in the interviews and to use the interviews to check on the
meaning of the behavior she was seeing. The result is a rich description of
patterns in the beliefs, and variations in belief, that prosecutors express about
imagined jury behavior as an ethical resource in deciding the fairness of
prosecuting a case.
In some fields, journals expect that a manuscript will report on multiple
studies. If the separate studies replicate key findings using the same method,
the additional research findings provide evidence for the reliability of the
results. If the separate studies replicate key findings using different methods,
this replication in addition supports the validity of the findings. Such
multistudy manuscripts may entail significant extra cost, however,
particularly when the cost of the original data collection for one study is high.
Few law schools currently provide the infrastructure to support the
multistudy activities that are the norm in the traditional laboratory
environments in the sciences. As a result, manuscripts that contain crossstudy replication in empirical legal scholarship may be less common than in
some other fields, unless the methodology used is a brief vignette
administered to online respondents 50 or draws on easily accessible data sets.
E. The Promise of Collaboration
Scholars often tout the benefits of collaboration and predict that
increased collaboration will accompany the rise of empirical scholarship in
the legal academy. 51 In light of these claims, it may be surprising that all five
of the articles in this inaugural empirical legal scholarship issue of the
Northwestern University Law Review are single-authored publications. The
absence of multiauthor publications in this issue, as compared with the
coauthorship rate in the seventeen articles published in the two issues of the
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (JELS) in the second half of 2018,
presents a stark difference. Only four of the seventeen published in JELS
were sole-authored, five had two authors, and eight had three authors.
Although this is a comparison based on small samples, there are a few
reasons why the pattern may be more than a fluke. First, three of the five
authors in this issue of the Law Review have both JD and PhD degrees,
bringing both legal and nonlegal disciplinary expertise to their work, and
49

Offit, supra note 29, at 1084–88.
Krin Irvine, David A. Hoffman & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Law and Psychology Grows Up, Goes
Online, and Replicates, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 320, 320–21 (2018).
51 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Evidence-Based Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 908 (2011); Diamond, supra
note 18, at 817.
50
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perhaps reducing the need for collaborators. Second, as is common in legal
scholarship, all of the authors in this issue offer thanks to a number of other
scholars who provided input on the work or to participants at workshops
where they presented a draft of the manuscript. This scholarly tradition at
law schools, which in my view is highly desirable, is not the norm outside
the legal academy, where papers submitted for publication are less likely to
be circulated or workshopped in advance of publication. A third possible
explanation is that three of the authors whose work appears in this issue are
relatively junior scholars in the academy. Despite the synergy that
collaboration can stimulate, faculties all too often use the easy way to
identify a scholar’s contributions: they give disproportionate weight to soleauthored publications. That bias continues to be an obstacle to collaboration.
We will have to wait to see what the future holds, but if the legal academy
wants empirical legal scholarship to flourish, it would do well to adopt a
friendly posture toward collaboration to accompany its welcoming stance
toward JD–PhD training. Although transaction costs are associated with any
collaboration, the extra years of JD–PhD schooling impose costs as well.
Collaboration by researchers with different disciplinary backgrounds as well
as interdisciplinary training in a single scholar can maximize the vision
reflected in empirical legal scholarship.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The scholarship represented in this first annual empirical issue of the
Northwestern University Law Review reflects the wide range of methods that
can be used to study law and legal institutions—from ethnography (Offit) to
machine-coded archival analysis (Sanga), from secondary analysis of
historical materials using a new theoretical perspective (Bernstein) to a
creative combination of information on the same cases obtained from
multiple sources (Ashtor). Despite the diversity of these methodological
approaches, all of these articles have one crucial feature in common: they
use those methods to tackle important empirical questions. Similarly, in the
fifth article, Kohler-Hausmann wrestles with central conceptual and
methodological issues that arise when we attempt to define and measure
discrimination. In an age of easy low-cost access to many types of data, it
may be tempting to let ease of data collection guide the nature of the research,
to gather low-hanging fruit readily available on trivial topics. The articles
published in this issue represent a very different, albeit more laborious,
question-driven form of inquiry.
By enlisting professional peer review, the editors of this inaugural
empirical issue of the Law Review have addressed directly a key criticism
that has traditionally undermined the quality, and perceived quality, of
1240
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empirical work published in student-edited law reviews. The enthusiastic
scholarly response from those submitting manuscripts for consideration, and
from the reviewers who provided feedback to the authors and editors, bodes
well for the future. Serious empirical research is hard, and it takes a genuine
community to produce an issue like this one. The investment pays off in the
quality of the result.
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